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I. INTRODUCTION
For securities disclosure, it is both the best of times and the worst
of times. On the one hand, some scholars, such as former United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Agency)
Commissioner Troy Paredes,' Steven Schwarcz,2 and Henry Hu,3 have
either renewed an old attack on mandatory issuer disclosure or
questioned the effectiveness of securities disclosure in the context of
modem financial instruments.4  Paredes claims that mandatory
disclosure rules prove ineffective because investors suffer from
"information overload."5  Schwarcz and Hu argue that disclosure
cannot describe the complexity of modem firms and finance.6 These
attacks have coincided with a broader academic critique of mandatory
disclosure as a tool for protecting consumers and come after a global
financial crisis that stemmed in large part from massive information
failures in financial markets, particularly in securitization and
derivatives.8  The academic criticism of mandatory securities
disclosure has provided some of the intellectual underpinnings for
1. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003).
2. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
2008 UTAH L. REv. 1109 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosures Failure]; Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexit, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 1
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm].
3. See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex To Depict? Innovation, 'Pure Information,"
and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEx. L. REv. 1601 (2012).
4. For an earlier volley in the debate on whether mandatory securities disclosure was
justified, compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984) (questioning many justifications for
mandatory disclosure), with John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
MandatoryDisclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV 717 (1984) (supporting mandatory disclosure).
5. Paredes, supm note 1, at 419; see also Troy A. Paredes, Information Overload and
Mandatory Securities Regulation Disclosure, REGBLOG (June 16, 2015), http://www.regblog.
org/2015/06/16/paredes-mandatory-securities-disclosure/ (suggesting that the amount of
information disclosed is overwhelming).
6. See Hu, supra note 3; Schwarcz, Disclosure s Failure, supra note 2; Schwarcz,
Rethinang the Disclosure Paradgm, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN You WANTED
To KNOw: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
8. See infr Part II.C.
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recent SEC regulatory initiatives, such as the Agency's "Disclosure
Effectiveness" initiative,9 and proposed legislation in the United States
Congress to simplify or cut back disclosure rules."
On the brighter side for mandatory disclosure, the SEC has
launched, or is considering launching, new initiatives to use technology
to improve the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure in informing
investors and helping them analyze issuers and securities issuances.
As an early example, the SEC's "XBRE' initiative required issuers to
attach data tags to their disclosures to enable investors to pull similar
financial data from a range of issuers and place it in spreadsheets or
other analytic tools, enabling investors to compare issuers side-by-
side.' The SEC followed with a rule requiring that data tags be affixed
to loan-level assets in securitization transactions."2 The Agency has
also moved incrementally towards requirements for more real-time
disclosure.'3
These technological approaches might be taken a step further,
including by borrowing from work done by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) in improving consumer finance regulation.
A next generation of securities rules might promote web-based
disclosure with carefully designed, hyperlinked, and nested layouts.'4
The SEC might also pursue other interactive disclosures, such as
calculators, to allow investors to adjust the assumptions underlying
disclosure or tailor disclosure for their particular investment priorities.'5
9. See Request for Comment on the Effectiveness of Financial Disclosures About
Entities Other than the Registrant, Securities Act Release No. 9929, Exchange Act Release
No. 75,985, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,849, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,083 (Oct. 1,
2015).
10. E.g., Disclosure Modernization and Simplification Act of 2015, H.R. 1525, 114th
Cong. (2015). Disclosure Effectiveness recently became a flash point in Congress: Senator
Elizabeth Warren criticized the SEC's Disclosure Effectiveness initiative for attempting to
weaken investor protections. Andrew Ackerman, Elizabeth Warren Says Shes 'More
Disappointed than Ever' with SEC Chief, WALL STREET J. (June 14, 2016, 1:38 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-says-shes-more-disappointed-than-ever-with-
sec-chief-1465925882.
11. See Interactive Data To Improve Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release No.
9002, Exchange Act Release No. 59,324, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,609, 74
Fed. Reg. 6776 (Feb. 10, 2009) (codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 229-230, 232, 239-240, 249
(2015)).
12. See Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 9638, Exchange Act Release No. 72,982, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184 (Sept. 24, 2014) (codified
at 17 C.ER. pts. 229-230, 232, 239-240, 243,249).
13. See Erick D. Prohs, Note, PeliOaic FinancialReporting-A Relic of the Past, 27
J. CORP. L. 481 (2002).
14. Seei fiaPart II.B.1.
15. See ihfla Part flI.B.2. Some commentators have proposed "layering" as a way to
insulate certain types of disclosure from antifraud liability. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r,
2016] 1145
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Still more ambitious reforms might require issuers to disclose more
granular information about their investment portfolios1 6 or to make the
risk models they use open-source."
These two sides of disclosure-a deep skepticism combined with
a technological optimism-raise questions about whether technology
can address some of the potential information failures involved in
mandatory disclosure. Can new technologies help investors
understand complex firms, particularly financial institutions, as well as
complex financial instruments and markets, while not overtaxing the
cognitive abilities of individuals? Investors need a rich set of
information to value firms and securities, but the fear is that they
cannot process too much information or that too much information
will exacerbate behavioral biases and prompt cognitive errors.
In order to answer these questions, it is crucial first to interrogate
the overload and complexity critiques. First, the overload critique
lacks extensive empirical data on what kinds or items of disclosure are
superfluous or impose excessive cognitive taxes on investors. Indeed,
the ratio of the overload critique's political traction in Washington
D.C.8 to the empirical evidence that overload is a problem for investors
is remarkably high. Both the overload and complexity critiques are not
entirely persuasive when they grapple with the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH). Efficient capital markets prove quite good at
impounding complex information that might overload even significant
subsets of the investor population.'9 The response of some scholars
who make these critiques is that many securities markets exhibit
profound informational inefficiencies. However, the markets that are
least informationally efficient are generally also those subject o the
least amount of mandatory disclosure." Moreover, some of the most
severe information failures in both the "Enron era" and the subprime
financial crisis stemmed from too little disclosure, not too much.2'
Despite these concerns, it would be wrong to dismiss the overload and
SEC, Remarks at the 2nd Annual Institute for Corporate Counsel (Dec. 6, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540462287.
16. See infa Part ll.C.1.
17. See infa Part UI.C.2.
18. See infia text accompanying note 121.
19. For a germinal work in legal scholarship on the applications of the EM to law,
see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REv. 549 (1984).
20. See hifia notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
21. See iafia Part II.C.
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complexity critiques out of hand and not to search for ways to improve
the effectiveness of issuer disclosure rules.
The search must start, however, with a more nuanced and
tractable sense of what "complexity" means. This Article describes
three types of complexity: contractual complexity, which describes
the intricate contractual terms or structural features that certain
financial instruments may have;22 derivative complexity, which
describes how certain securities derive their value from other assets or
multiple layers of assets;23 and systemic complexity, which describes
how the value and risks of any security may depend not only on
underlying assets, but also on changes elsewhere in financial markets.4
When paired, the overload and complexity critiques highlight a
deep tension between the need for rich and extensive information, on
the one hand, and the needs of investors for cognitively digestible
information, on the other. Researchers in psychology, computer
science, and software have long grappled with similar tensions
between users' demand for access to volumes of information and their
need to navigate through information easily and to drill down to
particular areas of concern.5  This research and some of the
technologies it has fostered hold promise for improving disclosure
rules.
However, securities disclosure has some unique challenges not
necessarily present in other information contexts. First, early
problems with the XBRL initiative underscore the importance of
comparability for issuer disclosure." Indeed, even prominent critiques
of mandatory disclosure admit that mandatory disclosure fulfills an
important standardizing function that enables investors to compare like
pieces of financial or other information across different issuers to
make investment decisions.28 At the same time, drafters of the
22. See hn/ia Part lI.B.
23. See 7i Part I.B.
24. See hnm Part f.B. Instead of creating a typology of forms of complexity, some
scholars have looked to create an extended catalogue of various features of financial
instruments, issuers, and markets that make disclosure more complex. See, e.g., Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REv 211, 216-36
(2009). The downside of that approach, compared to the kind of typology created in this
Article, is that it becomes harder to generalize about types of problems or market failures and
to find overarching solutions.
25. See irn/a notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
26. For an excellent and comprehensive account of the functions and informational
challenges of issuer securities disclosure, see ONNIG H. DOMBALAGiAN, CHASING THE TAPE:
INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS (2015).
27. See ifa notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supma note 4, at 687, 701.
2016] 1147
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disclosure rules (as have drafters of accounting standards) have long
grappled with the need for investors to drill down to the assumptions
and methodologies that underlay a particular disclosure or a
discretionary choice by an issuer.29 Most problematic of all, issuers
sometimes face strong incentives to game disclosure rules to
accentuate the positive and eliminate (or at least obscure) the negative
aspects of their businesses and financial condition."
Technological improvements to disclosure also raise old
challenges that any mandatory disclosure regime must face. For
example, issuers fear that mandatory disclosure may force them to
reveal proprietary information.' In a variation on this theme, some
technology proposals, such as improving asset-backed securities
disclosure via tagging loan-level information on mortgages and other
consumer debt contracts, may compromise the privacy of individual
borrowers.32 Increasing the speed of disclosure may make it harder for
issuers and intermediaries (such as auditors) to verify information and
make it more difficult for investors and other intermediaries (such as
stock analysts and credit rating agencies) to analyze that information
intelligently.33 This could make disclosure more prone to error and
manipulation and securities markets more volatile.4
Many of these technological enhancements to mandatory
disclosure face other, deeper challenges. First, many do not
necessarily address the most pressing information failures at the root
of the financial crisis. Second, they do not necessarily reflect what
investors, institutional and otherwise, would use to evaluate securities.
Indeed, there is a risk that the SEC or other policy makers may craft
enhancements that meet hypothetical, rather than real, investor
demands and that may thus be underused. Initiatives either to prune or
29. See ifia Part IH.A.1.
30. E.g., Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Studyih Secunties
Disclosure ArbiMage, 96 VA. L. REV 1, 67 (2010) (discussing evidence of gaming mandatory
disclosure rules on ethics); cf Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure.
Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowermen4 85 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1404-05 (1999)
(arguing that managers do not naturally elect to provide the type of disclosure that mandatory
disclosure rules stipulate).
31. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURImES REGULATION 36-37 (2002).
32. See Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 9638, Exchange Act Release No. 72,982, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184 (Sept. 24, 2014) (codified
at 17 CER. pts. 229-230, 232, 239-240, 243, 249 (2015)).
33. DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 26, at 47-48 (explaining the importance of verification
of issuer disclosure); see infa notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
34. See infa Part I.A.3.
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technologically enhance mandatory disclosure should be subject to
empirical and experimental testing.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes and
critiques the information-overload and complexity criticisms of
mandatory disclosure, provides a thumbnail sketch of some of the
information failures in the recent financial crisis, and outlines recent
regulatory and legislative initiatives to "simplify"--or roll back-
regulations requiring issuer disclosure. Part III examines several of the
initiatives and proposals to use technology to improve mandatory
issuer disclosure and describes the advantages and drawbacks to each.
Part IV concludes by advocating for more empirical and experimental
testing of proposals either to remove or technologically enhance
disclosure. It also argues that old-fashioned disclosure on the purposes
for certain securities issuances, the due diligence performed by issuers
and intermediaries, and the incentives of those parties might have a far
more profound effect on the understanding of investors and the
disciplining of issuers and intermediaries than either rollbacks of
disclosure regulations or hi-tech disclosure solutions.
II. THE MODERN CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE:
OVERLOAD, COMPLEXITY, AND INFORMATION FAILURES
A. Overload and Complexity
Mandatory securities disclosure has endured periodic attacks by
legal scholars who have focused on whether required disclosure adds
any information that investors and financial markets could not demand
or otherwise obtain." In the twenty-first century, several legal scholars
have either revived this critique or otherwise questioned the
effectiveness of modem securities disclosure, but with two
contemporary twists. The first strand of this renewed critique argues
that investors now suffer from overload, and the second argues that
disclosure cannot capture the complexity of modem issuers and their
securities.
35. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4; see also HOMER KRuPKE, THE SEC AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979) (arguing that
corporate disclosure requirements have yet to find a useful purpose); George J. Benston,
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973) (examining "the economic rationale for the regulation
of the securities markets").
2016] 1149
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1. Information Overload
Former SEC Commissioner and law professor Paredes argues
that securities disclosure overloads investors with too much
information.36 The cognitive limitations and behavioral biases of
investors and the costs of processing massive amounts of financial
disclosure, according to Paredes, mean that securities disclosure has
not only become less effective in informing the investing public, but
also has become counterproductive.7 Investor decision making can
become suboptimal, Paredes contends, because investors take mental
shortcuts to sift through the massive amount of information that a
securities issuer is required to disclose.8 Investors inevitably select
only a portion of any issuer's disclosure to process and on which to
base their investment decisions. Often, investors pick the wrong
information." Paredes concludes from his findings that policy makers
should consider pruning securities regulations on disclosure to reduce
information overload and improve investor decisions.4"
Paredes's arguments have significant limitations. Paredes
recognizes that less sophisticated investors may free ride off more
sophisticated investors who can better process voluminous securities
disclosure.41 Yet he responds with arguments that sophisticated
investors can also face information overload from disclosure."2 He also
concedes that the EMH suggests that it does not matter that certain
individual investors may be overwhelmed by information; the
marketplace collectively will process information.3 He responds to the
EMH in part by noting that behavioral finance has shown that there are
limitations to the EMH and that, at times, many securities markets are
not informationally efficient."
His response has two problems. First, Paredes does not provide
much empirical evidence of which markets suffer from informational
inefficiencies, nor evidence of when and to what extent. Second, as I
explain below, the securities markets that are the least informationally
efficient-Rule 144A and private placement markets-are also subject
36. See Paredes, supra note 1.
37. Seeid at 441-43.
38. See id. at 440-42.
39. Id. at 442.
40. See id. at 484.
41. See id. at 452-53.
42. See id at 453-58.
43. See id. at 480; see also Gilson & Krakman, supm note 19 (analyzing the
application of the EMH to law).
44. SeeParedes, upranote 1, at 481-83.
1150 [Vol. 90:1143
DISCLOSURE 2. 0
to much lower disclosure regulations than public markets. This means
that the scope of the overload problem may be limited. It also raises an
interesting question of causation: perhaps markets are less efficient
and overload is more of a problem because of too little required
disclosure, rather than too much.
In general, Paredes relies much more on theoretical arguments
from behavioral finance and intuition and less on empirical evidence
that investors cannot process mandatory disclosure. The Paredes
critique does not specify how much information is optimal and how
much is overload. Paredes, in fact, admits that empirical evidence
would be necessary to determine which items of financial disclosure
are helpful for investors and which are superfluous or counterpro-
ductive." Paredes also recognizes that this, in turn, begs the question
of how to address the demands of different investors for different kinds
of information.' Lastly, some information overload may stem not
from regulation, but rather from issuer efforts to bury disclosure.
Issuers looking to hide information that might depress the value of
their securities might adopt the "disclose the phonebook" strategy.
Both SEC regulatory actions" and judicial doctrines48 attempt to
counteract this perverse incentive to overdisclose.
2. Schwarcz on Complexity
In a series of articles, Schwarcz does not attack mandatory
disclosure as a general matter, but questions its effectiveness in the
face of complex financial instruments and markets. He argues that
securities disclosure fails to capture the "complexity" of modem
financial instruments and markets. In a 2004 article, he argues that the
demise of Enron revealed a larger failure of securities disclosure to
remedy information asymmetries in securitizations, derivatives, and
45. Seeid at 473-74.
46. See id. at 459-60.
47. See sources cited infra note 126.
48. For example, courts have developed the "buried facts" doctrine. As one court
explained:
Under the "buried facts" doctrine, a disclosure is deemed inadequate if it is
presented in a way that conceals or obscures the information sought to be
disclosed. The doctrine applies when the fact in question is hidden in a
voluminous document or is disclosed in a piecemeal fashion which prevents a
reasonable shareholder from realizing the "correlation and overall import of the
various facts interspersed throughout" he document.
Werner v. Werner, 267 E3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares,
Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
2016] 1151
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other structured finance transactions because of the growing
complexity of those transactions.49 In a similar vein as Paredes,
Schwarcz argues that markets and policy makers should not
necessarily take comfort from the ability of sophisticated institutional
investors and their experts to process complex information; he
contends that institutional investors do not hire sufficient experts and
that experts themselves are subject to behavioral biases and cognitive
limitations." Like Paredes, Schwarcz also argues that the EMH may
have limited application to many markets, such as asset-backed
securities markets.' Moreover, Schwarcz posits that the complexity of
structured finance transactions may prevent a critical mass of
sophisticated investors from sufficiently understanding particular
transactions and driving market prices to an efficient level.2 After the
financial crisis took root, Schwarcz, in a 2008 article, analyzed how
complexity frustrated the ability of parties to a securitization to
understand a transaction.53  Schwarcz concludes that because
complexity decreases the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure, policy
makers should focus attention on regulations other than disclosure,
such as third-party certification of securities.'
Schwarcz's critique has several weaknesses. Asset-backed
securities and credit derivative markets are not the best examples to
critique disclosure requirements. Both of these markets are far from
efficient. Most asset-backed securities issuances are not SEC-
registered, but are instead Rule 144A offerings. These securities trade
in relatively illiquid markets compared to SEC-registered and
exchange-listed securities. Credit derivatives generally trade over-
the-counter, which means that these markets are even less
informationally efficient." The lower levels of efficiency in these
markets make it problematic to draw conclusions for more liquid and
informationally efficient markets. Moreover, publicly issued, SEC-
registered securities are subject to vastly more disclosure rules than
49. See Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 2, at 4-6.
50. Seeid at 13-15.
51. See id at l8.
52. Id
53. See Schwarcz, Disclosure ' Failure, supra note 2.
54. Seeidat ll21.
55. Indeed, law firms advise that issuers disclose this to investors notwithstanding the
fact that Rule 144A was created to make a more liquid market for unregistered securities.
See, e.g., Lloyd S. Harmetz, Frequently Asked Questions About Rule 144A, MORRISON &
FOERSTER 7, 15 (2016), http://media.mofo.com/fdes/Uploads/Images/FAQRule 144A.pdf
56. Randall Dodd, Markets. Exchange or Over-the-Counter, IMF, http://www.imf.
org/extemal/pubslft/fandd/basicsmarkets.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2012).
1152 [Vol. 90:1143
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Rule 144A or over-the-counter derivative markets.7 These disclosure
rules improve the efficiency of public markets. Improved efficiency-
and by extension disclosure rules-might make the complexity that
Schwarcz describes in financial products much less worrisome
because more sophisticated investors can analyze the products and less
sophisticated investors can free ride off the market price. As with the
overload critique, there is a causality question here: more, not less,
disclosure might remedy the complexity problem.
In addition, Schwarcz's use of Enron as an example of disclosure
failing in the face of complexity in one of his earlier articles fails to
persuade.58 Enron's complex off-balance-sheet financings were not
naturally complex phenomena. Enron executives designed them to be
complex to deceive investors and create artificial revenues. The
company's minimal disclosure of these transactions was designed to
obfuscate their true purpose. The problem was not that it was
impossible for disclosure to describe a complex energy company's
financial position, but rather that this company designed its financial
position and wrote its disclosure in order to perpetrate a fraud, and
Enron's auditors failed to stop it.59
3. Hu on Complexity
Hu argues that the risks and rewards of issuers may be "too
complex to depict." He makes a more conceptual and epistemologi-
cal argument against disclosure than Schwarcz. Hu argues that issuers
and financial intermediaries stand between investors and objective
reality and that their depictions of that objective reality cannot capture
adequately all its nuances. Like Schwarcz, Hu extensively uses asset-
backed securities to demonstrate his point.6"
Hu points out that as new parties enter at each step in the
securitization process, they suffer from worsening asymmetries
57. See Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand, The Impact of SEC Rule 144A on
Corporate Debt Issuance by International Firms, 77 J. Bus. 1073, 1073-74 (2004); Dodd,
supra note 56.
58. See Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm, supa note 2.
59. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting. Rules Versus
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VIL. L. REv. 1023, 1043, 1055 (2003); William W. Bratton,
Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TuL. L. REv. 1275, 1286, 1328, 1330
(2002). In his explanations of the Enron transactions, Schwarcz takes a slightly different
view, stopping well short of calling them fraudulent. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron
and the Use andAbuse of Special Prpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. GIN. L. REv.
1309 (2002).
60. SeeHu, supianote 3.
61. Seeid at 1633, 1642.
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compared to parties that entered earlier in the process. Originators of
loans sold into a securitization know far more about those assets than
the intermediaries that arrange the securitization. These arrangers, in
turn, know far more about the quality of the underlying assets than
asset managers (those that might actively manage a securitization
vehicle's portfolio) or credit rating agencies. Investors in asset-backed
securities know even less.3 Hu describes one of the side effects of
these dynamics-what this Article labels "derivative complexity"--
namely, the progressive deterioration of information about underlying
assets within a securitization, to say nothing of the further deterioration
when asset-backed securities are themselves securitized'
Hu points out several additional problems with disclosure for
asset-backed securities. First, this disclosure typically only
summarizes the characteristics of the underlying assets. These
summaries may obscure important nuances about the risk
characteristics of those assets." This is another facet of what this
Article calls "derivative complexity." Hu considers whether giving
investors more granular information about underlying assets might
resolve this problem.' This Article considers how technology might
help achieve that result in Part Ill.A.2, below.
Hu also describes how the disclosure to investors of how
waterfall payment rules in a securitization work may diverge from both
the original design of the arrangers who created the securitization as
well as the computer program that ultimately allocates cash flows from
underlying assets to the various tranches of asset-backed securities.
Divergence of the computer program (what Hu correctly identifies as
the real way that cash flows are allocated)"8 from the waterfall of
payments as disclosed can mislead investors. This divergence from the
original design of the arrangers means that those parties may
misunderstand the "bugs" in their creation." Hu briefly considers
whether this problem could be remedied by giving investors greater
information or even access to the computer programs that govern
securitization waterfalls." This Article elaborates on that possibility in
62. See id at 1635.
63. Id. at 1634-35.
64. Sweid; h~fra Part II.C. 1.
65. Hu, supra note 3, at 1636.
66. See id at 1643-46.
67. Seeid. at 1646-47.
68. Seeid. at 1641.
69. Seeid at 1636-41.
70. Seeid. at 1646-47.
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Part lI.C.2, which argues that some of these programs could be made
open-source.
Hu's argument does share a weakness with that of Schwarcz.
Like Schwarcz's use of Enron, Hu's argument downplays the fact that
issuers and financial intermediaries actively create the reality that they
then must describe. Moreover, issuers and financial intermediaries
may construct that reality (e.g., the complex waterfall payment rules
and other elaborate structures of securitizations) for dubious purposes,
including to hide "lemons" in the underlying assets, otherwise obscure
the true risks of a securitization, or even defraud investors.7 As this
Article explores in Part ll.C.2, these perverse incentives explain some
of the most scandalous transactions in the crisis. In addition,
intermediaries often made securitizations complex for the benefit of
issuers in order to help them game bank capital regulations.72
Even short of attempting to defraud investors, the various parties
to securitization transactions-including originators, the investment
banks that arranged the transactions, and reputational intermediaries
(notably, rating agencies)-had perverse incentives. The structure of
securitization motivated them all to take shortcuts in evaluating the risk
of underlying assets and passing quality information regarding that risk
to each other and ultimately on to investors.
B. Types of Complexity
Despite this shared weakness in the Schwarcz and Hu critiques,
they both describe legitimate concerns that securities disclosure may
not adequately describe to investors complicated issuers and securities.
This Article attempts to create a framework to identify and
differentiate various complexity problems. It argues that securities-
and particularly asset-backed securities, derivatives, and other
structured products-may exhibit at least three kinds of complexity.
First, securities may exhibit contractual complexity in that they
may have numerous contractual terms that define the rights of
71. William W Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal:
From MichaelMilken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2013) (describing
how special-purpose entities were used for deceptive purposes or to game regulations in both
the Enron and subprime-crisis eras).
72. ERiK E GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCiAL REGULATION 251-60 (2014);
Erik E Gerding, The Dialectics of Bank Capital- Regulation and Regulatory Capital
Arbitrage, 55 WAsHnumN L.J. 357 (2016) (describing the mechanics by which securitization
could be used for regulatory capital arbitrage); David Jones, Emerging Problems with the
Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING &
FIN. 35 (2000) (same).
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investors. Preferred stock typically has more contractual features (e.g.,
liquidation and dividend preferences) than common stock. Investors
may need to spend additional time reading the certificate that creates
preferred stock to understand this additional complexity. By contrast,
investors in bonds may need to spend even more time reading the bond
indenture to understand its provisions governing interest and principal
payments, covenants, events of default, and so on. Contractual
complexity increases even further with asset-backed securities.
Investors in those instruments will need to understand the provisions in
the relevant indenture that govern the payment waterfall (i.e., the
allocation of cash flows from underlying assets to the various classes
of securities being issued) and the collateral (i.e., the underlying
assets).73  Contractual complexity in an asset-backed-securities
issuance might be measured by the number of tranches of securities
being issued, the number of steps in the waterfall provisions, or the
presence or absence of other contractual structures. I have argued
elsewhere that boilerplate language and standardization of contractual
provisions allows investors to economize on reading and
understanding these provisions.74  Standardization allows for
modularity, such that certain patterns of contractual provisions can
form standardized agreements (like indentures or notes) and certain
patterns of agreements can form standardized transactions (like
secured lending or asset-backed securities).5
73. For a summary of some of the structural features of asset-backed securities, ee
Steven P. Baum, The Secuitization of Commercial Property Deb4 hi A PRtMER ON
SECURTZATION 45, 49 (Leon T Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1st MiT Press
paperback ed. 2000) (describing commercial mortgage-backed securities), and Leon T.
Kendall, Secuitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION,
supra at 1.
74. See Erik F Gerding, Contract as Pattem Lalnguage, 88 WASH. L. REv. 1323, 1345-
47 (2013). Hu makes a similar argument when he argues that greater standardization of
asset-backed-securities vocabulary and transaction structures might help investors and
intermediaries lower complexity and increase understanding of those instruments. See Hu,
supra note 3, at 1647-50.
75. Gerding, supra note 74, at 1345-47. Making contracts more standardized and
more modular also creates risks. Contracts may become too rigid and prevent parties from
adapting to changed economic circumstances. For example, rigidity built into certain
securitization contracts prevented mortgage services from agreeing to restructure mortgage
loans. Id at 1352 (citing Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstei
Contracts. Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L.
REv 1075, 1087-89 (2009)). Even when attorneys have the ability to change standardized
contracts to adapt to economic or legal shocks, they may surprisingly fail to do so. Mnv
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Second, some securities may exhibit derivatve complexity in that
asset-backed securities, derivatives, and other structured products
derive their value from underlying assets. For example, mortgage-
backed securities pay out according to payments received on the
mortgages underlying the securities. Often, asset-backed securities
may be backed by other securities, which might in turn be backed by
additional layers of securities. This layering of securitization upon
securitization has an analogue in derivatives: a counterparty to a
derivative contract can hedge various risks by entering into a second
derivative contract with yet another counterparty.6  Derivative
complexity increases with (1) the number of layers of assets
underlying a particular financial instrument, (2) the diversity of assets
in each layer, and (3) the complexity of each of those underlying assets
(which itself can be measured along the dimensions of the three kinds
of complexity outlined in this Subpart).
Third, these financial products may exhibit systemic complexiy.
The value and risks of any product depend not only on underlying
assets and the contractual terms governing the product, but also on
changes in the marketplace. Most basically, the financial instrument
may have a market price, which may depend in part on the market
prices of substitute instruments. The potential loss from changes in
market prices is often labeled as market risk77 Financial instruments
are also subject to liquidityisk(i.e., the risk that the number of willing
buyers for a particular product will suddenly plummet, causing the
market to dry up)."8 Finally, both issuers and their securities are subject
to systemic risk (i.e., the risk of market-wide losses, against which
By design, standardized and modularized contracts enable the development of both
complex transactions-such as securitizations-and markets-such as asset-backed-
securities and credit derivative markets. Gerding, supra note 74, at 1345-47. These markets
may suffer the types of information failures described infra Part .C. Gelpern & Levitin,
supra; at 1087-89; Gerding, supra note 74, at 1352-53; see also Hu, supra note 3, at 1649
(describing how standard form contracts for derivatives became 'building blocks' for [more]
complex financial innovations"). Lastly, mistakes in the drafting or interpretation of
standardized contracts can be propagated, causing widespread economic ramifications. Id. at
1649-50.
76. For a discussion of the layering of securitizations and credit derivatives, see
Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Strucured Finance, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2009, at 3.
77. Erik E Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REv. 127, 137-38
(2009).
78. Id. at 138.
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diversification offers no protection).79 Systemic complexity captures
all three forms of risk-market, liquidity, and systemic--each of
which is more difficult to evaluate and model than the last.8" Systemic
complexity increases when the value of a financial instrument or
security is more heavily dependent on the price movements of a
greater number of other financial instruments (other than underlying
assets).
Of these three forms of complexity, sophisticated investors may
have the least difficulty navigating contractual complexity. Retail
investors might have difficulty reading through a prospectus and
indenture for an asset-backed security, but sophisticated investors are
likely to have considerable experience with the contractual
terminology and structures involved in such a financial product.
Systemic complexity may pose the greatest challenges. To evaluate
liquidity risk, for example, investors need information not just on
issuers and securities in their own portfolios, but also on the securities
in the portfolios of other investors. Improving disclosure of investment
portfolios, particularly with regard to institutional investors, becomes
critically important for investors to understand liquidity risk and
systemic complexity. I address how technology might improve this
kind of disclosure in Part IJ.C., below.
The systemic-risk component of systemic complexity is less of a
concern for investors. After all, if diversification offers no protection
against market-wide shocks, disclosure to the market matters less.
However, prudential regulators and central banks can take steps to
mitigate systemic risk by regulating financial institutions and markets
and setting overall macroeconomic policies. However, securities
disclosure might give these policy makers an additional regulatory tool
to gather and double-check information on systemic risk. For
example, greater information about the investment portfolios of
various institutional investors (many of which might lie outside the
jurisdictional silo of a particular financial regulator) can help
regulators identify worrying correlations and herd behavior.
79. Id at 138-39. See generally George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, W"atIs
Systemic Pisk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. REv. 371, 371
(2003) (discussing the definitions and sources of systemic risk and the damage it causes);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (discussing the definitions and
sources of systemic risk and how it should be regulated).
80. See Gerding, supra note 77, at 138-39.
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C Informadon Failures in the Financial Cisis
These three forms of complexity provide a framework for
understanding the information failures in the subprime financial crisis.
The financial crisis, in turn, provides indications of which forms of
complexity may prove the most worrisome for financial disclosure.
The following does not attempt to describe the financial crisis soup to
nuts. Rather, it highlights key information failures and some of the
most important problems that disclosure, including technologically
enhanced disclosure, might address.
1. Information Destruction: Tracing and Granularity
The discussion above previewed some of the problems with long
chains of asset-backed securities and credit derivatives. For one, long
chains of these financial instruments cause information about the
ultimate underlying assets-the debt that determines the cash flows
that feed all the subsequent layers of asset-backed securities or
derivatives--to deteriorate. Small errors in measuring potential loss
correlations and pricing assets that occurred early in the chain became
magnified at each subsequent link in the chain. When mortgages
began defaulting, unexpected loss correlations materialized.8' For
asset-backed-securities investors, the problem was less that their asset-
backed securities defaulted en masse and more that they could not tell
whether their securities would be affected. The difficulty tracing back
which cash-producing assets ultimately underlay their particular
securities made it extremely difficult for asset-backed-securities
investors to value their holdings." It was akin to small traces of poison
entering the base of the food chain; the poison would become
potentially more toxic as it moved up the chain, but it was difficult to
track the food supply. All of this was courtesy of derivative
complexity. As Hu points out, tracing became difficult in part because
disclosure on the assets underlying any particular securitization was
not sufficiently granular; investors could access only aggregated
information about the collateral.83
Faced with the uncertainty of valuing their holdings and with
ratings downgrades, investors began fire sales of asset-backed
securities just as liquidity in those markets evaporated. Liquidity risk
81. See Coval, Jurek & Stafford, supra note 76, at 15.
82. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidi&y and Credit Crunch
2007-2008, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 77, 81.
83. See Hu, supm note 3, at 1636.
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and systemic complexity reared their fearsome heads. Institutional
investors had not factored in the correlations between their investment
portfolios of asset-backed securities and derivatives and those of other
institutions.'4
2. Incentive Problems
Going back a step, information deteriorated along chains of asset-
backed securities not merely because the chains were long, but also
because the institutions that created and structured asset-backed
securities had dulled incentives to collect and pass along information
on underlying assets. Much ink has been spilled about the reduced
incentives of originating lenders to check the creditworthiness of those
mortgage borrowers whose mortgages the originators expected to sell
into a securitization" Originating lenders or any firm selling assets
into a securitization (e.g., a financial institution selling asset-backed
securities into a collateralized debt obligation) also had strong
incentives to cherry-pick and sell the worst assets-the lemons (to mix
fruit metaphors).86 Gatekeepers-the investment banks arranging and
underwriting asset-backed-securities transactions and credit rating
agencies-were supposed to have screened out these lemons, with the
gatekeepers' reputations on the line. After the crisis, these investment
banks paid billions of dollars to settle lawsuits alleging that the banks
did not adequately disclose their lack of diligence in screening the
assets that went into securitizationsY Credit rating agencies, long
criticized for conflicts of interest (because issuers paid their bills) and
for enjoying a regulator-granted monopoly," have themselves been
84. See Brunnermeier, supra note 82, at 81.
85. See, e.g, Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Staff Report No. 318:
Understanding the Secuitizion of Subprime Mortgage Credi'; FED. RES. BANK N.Y (Mar.
2008), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr318.pdf;
Christopher M. James, Mortgage-Backed Securites: How mpontant Is "Skin in the Game",
FED. RES. BANK S.E: ECON. LETrER (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/
publicationsleconomic-letter/2010/december/mortgage-backed-securities/; Benjamin J. Keys
et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprinme Loans, 125 Q.J.
ECON. 307 (2010). But see Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Secuntization andMoral Hazard:
Evidence from Credit Score CutoffRules, 63 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 1 (2014) ("Credit score
cutoff rules ... cannot be used to learn about the moral hazard effect of securitization on
underwriting.").
86. SeeAshcraft & Schuermann, supra note 85, at ii.
87. Stephen Grocer, A List of the Biggest Bank Settlements, WALL STREET J.:
MONEYBEAT (June 23, 2014, 12:03 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/06/23/a-list-
of-the-biggest-bank-settlements/.
88. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit RatingAgencies 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999).
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sued for misrepresenting the level of efforts they expended in
evaluating asset-backed securities."
Investment banks not only have been accused of lack of
diligence, they also have paid billions to settle lawsuits alleging darker
conflicts of interest. For example, Goldman Sachs (Goldman) settled
the SEC lawsuite' that stemmed from the infamous ABACUS
transaction. This was the subject of the United States Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation hearings that reignited
support for the then-stalled Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act' (Dodd-Frank) legislation.92 That lawsuit
alleged that Goldman created some securitizations to benefit short-
selling hedge funds that were betting against asset-backed securities.?
The lawsuit further alleged that Goldman and its employees
misrepresented the conflict of interest at the heart of the transaction to
the investors purchasing asset-backed securities: the hedge fund
betting against the securities helped pick the underlying pool of
mortgages.' Goldman eventually settled for $550 million, while one
of its employees was found civilly liable.95
The hundreds of billions of dollars of settlements in these
disclosure lawsuits has a profound implication for disclosure and the
overload and complexity critiques. These settlements uggest that
simple, nontechnologically enhanced, but robust, disclosure about
issuer and intermediary incentives, conflicts of interest, and levels of
diligence might be one of the most desirable disclosure fixes of all. I
return to this point in Part IVC.
89. See Arna Viswanatha & Karen Freifeld, S&P Reaches $1.5 Billion Deal with
US., States over Crisis-Era Ratings, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-s-p-settlement-idUSKBNOL71C1201 50203.
90. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Structuring
and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-59.him.
91. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42
U.S.C. (2012)).
92. Robert Schmidt, Clea Benson & Phil Mattingly, Goldman Sachs Misled
Congress, Duped Clients, Levin Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:36 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-14/goldman-sachs-misled-congress-after-duping-
cients-over-cdos-levin-says.
93. Press Release, SEC, supra note 90.
94. Id
95. Justin Baer, Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, 'Fab' Trader Liable in Fraud WALL
STREET J., http://www.wsj.con/articles/SB10001424127887323681904578641843284450004
(last updated Aug. 2, 2013, 12:05 AM).
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3. The Perils of Periodic Disclosure
The subprime crisis revealed other, less headline-grabbing
information failures. One failure reveals a new spin on the problems
with traditional SEC-required periodic reporting. Periodic reporting,
when combined with the snapshot nature of a balance sheet, can fail to
capture significant changes in an issuer's financial and other
conditions in between periodic reports. Some evidence shows that
securitizations may have been timed to take advantage of intermittent
securities disclosures. Securitization transactions before the crisis
appeared generally to have been timed to take place in the last several
days of a financial period. When a snapshot of a balance sheet or
quarterly report of an originating lender (or another institution selling
assets into a securitization) would have been taken, the assets would be
gone. The risk associated with those assets would not appear in a
disclosure, even if the issuer held that risk for much of the interval in
between periodic disclosures." The crisis laid bare the dangers in this
timing: when asset-backed-securities markets froze and new
securitizations shut down, originating lenders could no longer sell their
mortgages or other assets into a securitization. Risk (in this case,
taking the name "warehouse risk") suddenly materialized on these
issuers' balance sheets."
4. The Failures of Risk Models
The financial crisis proved the models that firms use to price
asset-backed securities and derivatives and to set investment and risk-
management strategies to be dangerously opaque. These pricing
models exhibited phenomenal failures in measuring risk in the current
financial crisis, as did the models that financial institutions relied on to
price loans, manage investment portfolios, set overall firm risk-
management policies, and even establish regulatory capital." These
models failed in part because of faulty assumptions, which were
largely hidden from investors.9  Opacity of risk models has other
96. Patricia M. Dechow & Catherine Shakespeare, Do Managers Time Securitization
Tmnsactions To ObtainAccountingBenefits?, 84 ACCT. RE. 99 (2009).
97. See Erik E Gerding, Bank Regulation and Secuitization: How the Law
Improved Transmission Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Cnises, 50 GA. L. REv. 89,
116 (2015).
98. Gerding, supra note 77, at 164-67. Under the Basel II Accord, certain large banks
were allowed to set their own regulatory capital requirements according to internal risk
models. Id at 154-57. The SEC extended this privilege to several large investment banks
under its now-defumct Consolidated Supervised Entities program. Id. at 158-59.
99. Id. at 182-83.
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negative consequences. It hides potential gamesmanship of models by
individuals within a financial institution. For example, traders in
financial institutions engaged in trading strategies that involved low-
probability, but high-magnitude, risks to evade detection by their firm's
risk models (a practice called "stuffing risk into the tails").'" In
addition, the fact that the details of any financial institution's risk
models remain largely secret prevents other financial institutions from
adequately evaluating their counterparty risk to that institution.' The
marketplace cannot necessarily rely on regulators to police risk
modeling and risk management because regulators may lack necessary
resources and expertise. Moreover, regulators may lack motivation;
from an international perspective, one nation's regulators may wish to
allow their home-country financial institutions to use looser models to
take on more risk, earn greater profits, and gain a competitive
advantage over institutions in other countries.2 The opacity of risk
models and regulatory auditing of those models obscures the failures
of regulators and can undermine international efforts to ensure
minimum standards across countries for financial institution
regulation."3
In addition, opacity of risk models hides potentially dangerous
levels of homogeneity in the risk modeling and risk management of
financial institutions. If financial institutions employ similar
investment and risk-management strategies, they may purchase the
same assets at the same time (causing prices to surge and creating
liquidity) and sell those assets simultaneously (causing prices to
plummet and liquidity to evaporate). There is some indication that this
homogeneity exacerbated the current financial crisis; many financial
institutions began suffering losses and selling assets at the same time."
In short, opaque risk models exacerbate systemic complexity.
100. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagemen4 N.Y TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24, 46.
101. Gerding, supra note 77, at 182-83.
102. Id. at 185. Hu has examined some of the potential errors in asset-backed-
securities disclosure where disclosure of cash-flow waterfalls does not match the actual
allocation of cash flows conducted by the computer programs used in a securitization. He
also explores a proposal to fix this disparity that resembles making risk models open-source:
investors might be given more direct access to these computer programs. Hu, supra note 3, at
1640-42. This proposal might have many of the advantages and rawbacks of open-source
risk models discussed imftri Part Ill.C.2.
103. SeeGERDING, supranote 72, at 185.
104. Id at 184-85.
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5. Remaining Puzzles
This Subpart's thumbnail sketch of information failures during
the financial crisis should not give the impression that all information
failures are well understood. Deep puzzles remain. For example,
Professor Bobby Bartlett documents a bizarre information inefficiency
during the crisis in the market for the securities of monoline bond
insurers.'°5  These firms insured many asset-backed-securities
issuances against default. However, even when asset-backed securities
known to be insured by these firms began to suffer ratings downgrades
and it looked probable that these insurers would have to make payment
on their policies and thus suffer significant losses, the securities of
these insurers did not experience significant price drops for an
extended period of time. It is unclear why investors were not able to
make use of readily available information and sell or begin shorting the
insurers' securities. Bartlett speculated that behavioral biases of
investors may hold one answer."6 Perhaps the overload or complexity
critiques might have some bite here.
D Regulatory Rollback?
The idea that mandatory disclosure is not only too costly for
issuers, but also ineffective and potentially counterproductive, has
fueled regulatory action and proposed legislation in Congress to
simplify, streamline, and roll back securities disclosure requirements.
The overload critique, in particular, has been explicitly invoked by
legislators and regulators seeking to reduce disclosure burdens on
issuers.
A brief recent history provides some context to the efforts to pare
back mandatory disclosure. In the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act"7 (JOBS Act), Congress took several steps to roll back or
simplify mandatory disclosure requirements. First, Congress reduced
the disclosure requirements for companies with total annual gross
revenues under $1 billion (what the statute labels "emerging growth
companies").' This move appeared to have been driven by an effort
to reduce the regulatory burden on corporations, instead of being
grounded in the needs of investors or in financial theory. Generally
105. See Robert P Bartlett, HII, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case
Study ofDenivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. Cop. L. 1(2010).
106. Seeidat53.
107. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter JOBS Act].
108. Seeid. §§ 101-107, 126 Stat. at 307-13.
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speaking, the securities of smaller companies are less likely to trade in
informationally efficient markets than larger companies. Indeed, the
SEC's decades-old integrated disclosure system, which allows larger
issuers to conserve on filing new disclosures with the SEC, is
premised on evidence that the securities of these larger companies
trade in more efficient markets.'" Thus, much of the information that
would otherwise go into new filings and mandatory disclosure has
already been digested by capital markets and impounded into the price
of those securities. The JOBS Act's "emerging growth" provisions
turn this logic on its head and give smaller companies exemptions
from disclosure rules."'
Against this backdrop, in the JOBS Act, Congress also required
that the SEC review a core mandatory disclosure rule, Regulation S-
K."' Congress told the SEC that the purpose of the review was "to...
determine how such requirements can be updated to modernize and
simplify the registration process and reduce the costs and other
burdens associated with these requirements for issuers who are
emerging growth companies.""' 2  The SEC Staff responded with a
report that reviewed several decades of SEC initiatives to streamline
mandatory disclosure requirements, including for smaller businesses."3
The report concluded with a proposal for the SEC to review, and
possibly revise, Regulation S-K, including simplifying risk-related
disclosure (such as disclosures on market risk) as well as disclosures
related to a registered issuer's business and operations, corporate
governance matters, executive compensation, and offering-related
matters."' The SEC Staff also recommended review of a wide range of
other regulations, including "Industry Guides" that govern disclosure
by issuers in particular industries, such as banking or real estate, and
109. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market EfflciencyRevisiteo 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 876 (1992).
110. Erik Gerding, JOBS Act Forum: Frank Gehy, Flashy Architecture, and Bad
Engineering, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/
04/jobs-act-forum-frank-gehry-flashy-architecture-and-bad-engineering.html.
111. See17C.ER. §229.10 (2015).
112. JOBS Act § 108, 126 Stat. at 313.
113. See Staff of the SEC, Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in
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Regulation S-X, which governs financial reporting."' These
recommendations cover a vast swath of mandatory disclosure rules.
The SEC Commissioners took up this invitation and launched the
Agency's Disclosure Effectiveness initiative. '16 The SEC's Division of
Corporation Finance began by requesting comments on certain parts
of Regulation S-X."7  Some Commissioners,"8 including the SEC
Chair, have indicated that a thrust of this Disclosure Effectiveness
initiative is to review whether disclosure has become "too much,"
repetitive, or duplicative of information available on the Internet or has
strayed from its original purpose."9 SEC Chair Mary Jo White frames
the potential pruning of mandatory disclosure in terms of the securities
law concept of materiality.'" The Commissioners in favor of
Disclosure Effectiveness have explicitly linked their views on pruning
disclosure to Paredes's information-overload argument.' Similarly,
members of Congress have cited the overload argument as justification
for proposed legislation to roll back the SEC rules on mandatory issuer
disclosure.2 The SEC initiative has coincided with proposals from the
115. See id. at 102-04. In 2015, Congress passed the Fixing America's Surface
Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015) (FAST Act), which requires
the SEC both to revise and scale back disclosure for emerging growth companies and certain
small issuers and to study further amendments to Regulation S-K to modernize and simplify
mandatory issuer disclosure and remove duplicative and immaterial disclosure requirements.
116. Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Staff Report on Public Company Disclosure
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540530
982; see also Keith E Higgins, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Disclosure Effectiveness,
Remarks Before the American Bar Association Business Law Section Spring Meeting (Apr.
11, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541479332.
117. See Request for Comment on the Effectiveness of Financial Disclosures About
Entities Other than the Registrant, Securities Act Release No. 9929, Exchange Act Release
No. 75,985, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,849, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,083 (Oct. 1,
2015); Higgins, supra note 116.
118. E.g., Gallagher, supranote 15.
119. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, Remarks at the
National Association of Corporate Directors Leadership Conference 2013 in National
Harbor, Maryland (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370
539878806.
120. Seeid
121. See id.; Gallagher, supra note 15. The risk of information overload has
undergirded the positions of at least two SEC Commissioners on a number of regulatory
issues, including opposing new SEC disclosure rules. E.g., Michael S. Piwowar, Comm'r,
SEC, Advancing and Defending the SEC's Core Mission, Remarks at he U.S. Chamber of
Commerce in Washington D.C. (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/
Speech/1370540671978; Daniel M. Gallagher & Michael S. Piwowar, Joint Statement on the
Commission Proposed Rule on Hedging Disclosues, SEC (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.sec.
gov/news/statement/020912ps-cdmg-cmsp.html; Daniel M. Gallagher & Michael S.
Piwowar, Joint Statement on the Conflict Minerals Decision, SEC (Apr. 28, 2014), https://
www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541665582.
122. See, e.g., H.R.REP.NO. 113-642(2014).
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Financial Accounting Standards Board to make disclosure more
"effective" by giving issuers more discretion to determine what is
material.'23 The sum total of these initiatives and the statements of
SEC Commissioners has led some commentators to worry that the
SEC and other policy makers are pursuing an aggressive deregulatory
agenda, including rolling back mandatory issuer disclosure.124
III. TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES
To the extent that overload and complexity-including its
contractual, derivative, and systemic forms-is a problem for
investors, the question is whether technology can offer a partial
remedy. Can technologies help break down the complex reality of
modem firms and their securities into information that can be
understood by investors? The SEC has a history of using technology
to improve the dissemination of issuer information, going back at least
to the introduction of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system, its electronic filing platform. 5 It also has
a history of efforts to make disclosure more understandable.'26 Lastly,
the Agency also has also recognized the importance of market
efficiency in tailoring mandatory disclosure.2 7
The ensuing discussion evaluates how the following technologies
might improve securities disclosure: developing data-tagging
disclosure, including the SEC's XBRL initiatives; giving granular
disclosure about investment portfolios, including tagging loan-level
assets in a securitization; moving towards real-time disclosure; making
disclosure web-based and improving its organization and layout
accordingly; making securities disclosure more interactive, including
via the use of calculators; and making parts of issuers' risk models
123. See Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Proposes Improvements
to Materiality To Make Financial Statement Disclosures More Effective (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c-FASBContentC&pagename=FASB%2FFASBCont
enLC0/o2FNewsPage&cid=l 176166401832.
124. See, e.g., Zach Carter, Obama Officials Resurrect George W Bush Deregulation
Plan, HUFFNGTON PosT, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/entry/obama-bush-deregulation-
us_5626b26de4b08589ef49896a (l st updated Oct. 21, 2015).
125. Electronic Filing and the EDGAR System: A Regulatory Overview, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2006).
126. One example is the SEC's "Plain English" initiative to have disclosure documents
written in understandable prose. See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
7497, Exchange Act Release No. 39,593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,011, 63
Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998) (codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 228-230, 239, 274 (2015)); Office of
Inv'r Educ. & Assistance, A Plain English Handbook: How To Create Clear SEC Disclosure
Docunents, SEC (Aug. 1998), https://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf.
127. Langevoort, supra note 109, at 874-76.
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open-source. Each technological fix addresses a different combination
of overload and complexity problems.
In evaluating these technologies, it is important to note that
understandability to investors is not the only policy objective.
Securities disclosure must also achieve comparability to allow
investors to make decisions among multiple investments and multiple
issuers.1"8 Issuer information also may have to be capable of being
encapsulated in a summary format for use by other informational
intermediaries in financial markets.129 However, if the encapsulated
information fails to capture enough important information or loses
sufficient nuance about the issuer, summary information may mislead
investors and lead to investment errors. At the same time, disclosure
must factor in some heterogeneity in terms of types of issuer
businesses and different investment needs. Disclosure must also be
capable of verification both within an issuer and by gatekeepers-
third-party intermediaries, such as auditors who certify the accuracy of
disclosure.'30
For issuers, increased mandatory disclosure brings with it the
specter of increased antifraud liability. This raises a thorny dilemma
for policy makers. On the one hand, safe harbors from liability might
encourage more disclosure and more innovation from issuers. On the
other hand, insulation from liability might create incentives for
sloppiness, puffery, or deception on the part of issuers.
A. Existing Ini'atves
1. XBRL
The SEC's XBRL initiative'3' provides a useful launching point
for analyzing how technology might enhance and reform disclosure.
32
128. DOMBALAGiAN, supra note 26, at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id at47-48, 51-52.
131. See Interactive Data To Improve Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release No.
9002, Exchange Act Release No. 59,324, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,609, 74
Fed. Reg. 6776 (Feb. 10, 2009) (codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 229-230, 232, 239-240, 249).
XBRL reporting was previously an entirely voluntary pilot project. See XBRL Voluntary
Financial Reporting Program on the EDGAR System, Securities Act Release No. 8529,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,129, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,747, 70 Fed.
Reg. 6556 (Feb. 8, 2005) (codified at 17 C.FR. pts. 228-229, 232, 240, 249, 270).
132. Some commentators lauded the potential of the XBRL Rule to increase
transparency in fimancial markets and allow an "army of citizen regulators" to police risk in
financial markets. E.g., Daniel Roth, Road Map for Financial Recovery: Radical




The XBRL initiative builds off the decades-old SEC EDGAR
regulations, which require firms and individuals who must submit
filings with the SEC to do so in an electronic format. EDGAR filings
are then available and searchable on the SEC's online EDGAR
database.'33 The XBRL rules now require SEC registrants to begin
embedding data "tags" in their electronic filings using a particular
computer language. These tags identify key items (called "elements"
in the relevant regulatory language) in financial statements using a
standardized taxonomy. These data tags allow investors to download
these separate pieces of financial statement information directly into
spreadsheets or other analytical software. Investors can then make
side-by-side comparisons of financial information-for example, cost
of goods sold, loans more than ninety days delinquent, or cash flow
from operations-from different issuers.
The XBRL initiative has engendered some controversy because
some issuers ee compliance costs, but see little use for the new data
format." Some commentators have identified a problem with issuers
choosing to customize the elements that they tag, which undermines
comparability across issuers.'35 Others have noted a deep tension in
XBRL that is common throughout disclosure: the need for
consistency in applying data tags to enable comparability must be
balanced against investor needs for rich, nuanced data that reflects the
differences in how issuers conduct business.'
Data tags might give the illusion that the financial information
being downloaded is complete. However, the footnotes to an issuer's
financial statements may contain material qualifications to a given
piece of standardized financial information. This presents an age-old
tension in financial disclosure. On the one hand, regulators want to
133. The EDGAR system was first created as a pilot program in the 1980s. See
Rulemaking for EDGAR System, Securities Act Release No. 6977, Exchange Act Release
No. 31,905, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,283, 58 Fed. Reg. 14,628 (Mar. 18,
1993) (explaining the EDGAR system generally and setting forth SEC rules and procedures
that apply to electronic submissions). In December 1994, the SEC required all domestic
issuers to make Exchange Act filings electronically via the EDGAR system. See
Rulemaking for EDGAR System, Securities Act Release No. 7122, Exchange Act Release
No. 35,113, Investment Company Act Release No. 20,783, 59 Fed. Reg. 67,752 (Dec. 30,
1994) (codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 228-230, 232, 239-240, 249-250, 259-260, 269, 274).
134. Kristine Brands, XBRL: Does the SEC XBRL Mandate Meet Investor
Expectations?, STRATEGIC FN., Apr. 2013, at 56.
135. See, e.g., Nicole E. York, The SEC Speaks-XBRL in Focus!, PUB. COMPANY
REP. (Sept. 8, 2013), https://publiccompanyreport.com/2014/09/08/the-sec-speaks-xbrl-in-
focus-2/.




allow issuers to present these nuances that might reveal critical
assumptions, methodologies, or limitations to standardized data.
Footnotes capture the heterogeneous nature of firms and allow for
more customized data. However, footnotes also frustrate comparison
and allow gamesmanship because issuers can bury key facts.'
37
Early on, the SEC and issuers grappled with errors in data
tagging, particularly as the process of tagging became increasingly
automated.138 The possibility of errors has led to calls for third-party
verification of the accuracy of data tagging.9 At the same time,
industry groups that created the XBRL standards and offer services to
help issuers comply stand to gain from keeping and enhancing the
XBRL rules. These groups have become a ready-made political
interest group for entrenching this largely obscure set of rules.'°
Automating data tagging and the resulting potential for errors will
become larger concerns should high-frequency traders use XBRL data.
2. Loan-Level Tagging in Asset-Backed Securities
The SEC decided to use the same computer language in XBRL to
meet a congressional mandate under Dodd-Frank"' requiring asset-
backed-securities issuers to disclose standardized loan-level data on
the assets underlying their securities.'42 This disclosure includes data
137. But see Frank D. Hodge, Jane Jollineau Kennedy & Laureen A. Maines, Does
Search-Facilitating Technology Improve the Tnsparency of Financial Reporting?, 79 ACCT.
REv 687 (2004) (arguing that search technologies using XBRL can also improve the
transparency of footnotes). This assumes, however, that the footnote disclosure can be
sufficiently standardized and reduced to quantified elements.
138. Jon Bartley, YS. Al Chen & Eileen Taylor, Avoiding Common Errors of XBRL
Implementation, J. ACCT. (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/
feb/20092058.html; David McCann, 18,000 Tagging Errors in XBRL Filings So Far, CFO
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://ww2.cfo.con/accounting-tax/2010/10/18000-tagging-errors-in-xbrl-
filings-so-far/.
139. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants XBRL Assurance Task Force,
Performing Agreed-Upon Procedures Engagements that Address the Completeness,
Accuracy, or Consistency of XBRL-agged Data, INT'L FED'N ACC. (Apr. 28, 2009), http://
www.ifac.org/system/files/meetings/files/20100614-IAASB-Agenda%2OItem8B-ACPA_
SOP_09- -final.pdf.
140. See Our Members, DATA COALMON, http://www.datacoalition.org/about/
members/ (last visited May 17, 2016); Justin Duncan, Rep. Hurts And-Open Data Bill Is
Back-And Would Move the SEC in the Wrong Directio DATA CoALmoN (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.datacoalition.org/small-company-disclosure-simplification-act/.
141. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 942(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1897 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)
(2012)).
142. SeeAsset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 9638, Exchange Act Release No. 72,982, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184 (Sept. 24, 2014) (codified
at 17 C.ER. pts. 229-230, 232,239-240,243, 249 (2015)).
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tags that investors could use to assess the quality of these assets,
whether mortgages, auto loans, or other debt. This rule aims to lower
the cost to investors in getting higher-quality information on the
underlying assets, even through multiple layers of securitization and
hedging. This tracing could improve the ability of investors to map the
web of securitizations and hedging in a nuanced fashion. By
understanding underlying assets, investors can analyze how risks-
including credit and market risk-affecting underlying assets course
through the system all the way to the securities they purchase. This
addresses some of the derivative complexity of asset-backed securities.
However, some of the same challenges that affect the XBRL rules
also affect this loan-level tagging initiative. Issuers may not use the
data tag in a standardized way or may make significant errors in
tagging information. The categories of information captured by the
data tags may not capture significant pieces of information about the
credit risk of mortgages or other loan pools.'43 Issuers may hide
significant loan terms in parts of the mortgages or other loan-level
assets that are not tagged or not susceptible to tagging. To ensure
reliability, these loan-level data tags ought to be subject to third-party
verification. Automation of data tagging might economize on costs,
but lead to undiscovered errors. In short, loan-level data tagging might
give investors the illusion that they have verified, accurate, and
complete information about the credit characteristics of underlying
loans.
Furthermore, tagging mortgages creates a problem that the
XBRL initiative does not. If the information on mortgages or other
consumer loans is sufficiently granular and complete, the privacy of
consumers might be compromised. Privacy scholars have called into
question whether this kind of information could be anonymized.'"
Other scholars have suggested that information intermediaries might
be used to protect consumer privacy,'5 but this would add to the
complexity and cost of tagging loan-level assets. One consolation,
143. SeeHu, supra note 3, at 1652-53.
144. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure ofAnonymizLton, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701 (2010).
145. See, e.g., Scott Peppet, Smart Mortgages, Pnvacy and the Regulatory Possibility
of Infomedalion (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 09-13, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfin?abstractid=1458064.
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which might be even more depressing to consumers, is that this private
information might already be deducible, even absent SEC regulation.
14 6
3. Real-Time Disclosure
Advances in information systems will enable more rapid and
frequent disclosure than current quarterly and other periodic reports. It
is conceivable that even more financial disclosure could be made
practically in real time. This would mimic how exchange trades are
reflected in real-time stock quotes. More frequent disclosure would
curtail the accounting gamesmanship of many issuers, noted above,
which is facilitated by the periodic and intermittent nature of current
disclosure.'4 7  Higher speed of disclosure may increase market
efficiency.
However, technologically enhanced disclosure, particularly more
frequent or real-time disclosure, will challenge the ability of issuers
and gatekeepers to verify and the ability of investors to process
information carefully. Real-time disclosure raises the following
questions:
Would dsclosure be sufficiently audited? Audit firms could
not realistically audit financial information disclosed in real time
(i.e., as transactions occur). Some information may be important
enough to merit slower disclosure to enable auditors to catch
potential accounting errors, whether deliberate or intentional.
Would tigher-speed disclosure promote greater market
volatility? Under the semistrong form of the EMH, real-time
material disclosure would have immediate effects on the market
price of an issuer's securities. This could make prices more
volatile and exacerbate noise trading.
Would higher volatilty be gamed by issuers, market
intermediaries, and sophisticated taders? Instantaneous
disclosure, higher volatility, and higher levels of noise trading
could allow sophisticated players in the marketplace to take
advantage of retail investors by using superior access to
information to trade ahead of the market, engage in insider
trading, or manipulate prices.
146. Paul Ohm & Scott Peppet, What IfEverything Reveals Everything?, in BIG DATA
Is NOr A MONOLITH (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds.,
forthcoming 2016).
147. See supra Part lI.C.3.
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B Borrowing from ConsumerFinance
For XBRL, loan-level data tagging, and incremental movements
towards real-time disclosure, the future is now. However, the SEC also
could consider a next generation of technologically enhanced
disclosure. In so doing, the SEC could learn lessons from the CFPB's
interdisciplinary research, in which the CFPB engaged research in
psychology, graphic design, technology, and social science in efforts to
redesign consumer financial disclosures."8
1. Web-Based Disclosure and Rethinking Layout
If disclosure would be increasingly delivered in electronic and
interactive formats, regulators, issuers, and securities lawyers could
rethink the overall presentation of disclosure to make it more
accessible, malleable, and "user friendly." Securities disclosure could
become increasingly web-based and hyperlinked. This would allow
users to click through disclosure, starting with more general
information. Investors could then click through the disclosure to
access more detailed information on particular disclosure items. This
might help investors navigate complex information and manage the
risk of information overload.
This accords with research from psychology, behavioral
economics, and law on how to help individuals overcome cognitive
limitations and behavioral biases. Indeed, heuristics might be used to
improve the decision making of investors and other individuals.'49 One
strand of this literature focuses on using regulations to improve the
"menu design" for consumer and investment choices available to
148. See, e.g., Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg.
51,116 (proposed Aug. 23, 2012) (codified at 12 C.ER. pts. 1024, 1026 (2015)). The CFPB
has explained the research that went into redesigning these consumer disclosures. See How
We Improved the Disclosures, CFPB, http://www.consumerfmance.gov/know-before-you-
owe/compare/ (last visited May 17, 2016); Kleimann Commc'n Grp., Inc., KnowBefore You
Owe: Evolution of the Integrated TILA-RESPA Disclosures, CFPB (July 9, 2012),
http://files.consumerfmance.gov/f/201207_cfpb-reporttila-respa-testing.pdf; Kleimann
Commc'n Grp., Inc., Know Before You Owe. Quantitative Study of the Current and
Integrated TJLA-RESPA Disclosures, CFPB (Nov. 20, 2013), http://files.consumerfmance.
gov/f/20131 l-cfpb..studyjila-respa disclosure-comparison.pdf.
149. This academic movement was popularized in RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
However, the idea of using heuristics to improve individual decision making has a much
longer intellectual history. See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH




individuals.' ° This approach on improving individual decisions can
also be applied to improving the layout and presentation of disclosure
to consumers. The "menu" metaphor is quite apt; software designers
have gleaned valuable experience on making software more user-
friendly. Drop-down menus and other interactive devices have been
introduced and progressively improved in software since the advent of
the graphical user interface (GUI). These devices allowed software to
perform more complex tasks and to be used by a greater range of
consumers.'
5'
As with other technologically enhanced disclosure, the challenge
with moving to a web-based, hyperlinked disclosure layout is ensuring
that data remains comparable. Who controls the layout is also critical.
There is a risk that some issuers might use complex layouts to frame
information in ways that unduly accentuate the positive and practically
eliminate the negative.
2. Interactive Disclosure: Calculators
Web-based disclosure might also enable a next generation of
interactive disclosure. Disclosure might enable investors to change
particular assumptions behind certain financial presentations and then
see how the results would change. For example, issuers have to
disclose the extent to which they are subject to market risk.'2 This
disclosure might be made interactive, so that investors could see how
market risk changes across a range of assumptions or confidence
intervals. This technology resembles the interactive calculators that
many financial firms' websites now offer. The United States
Department of the Treasury has endorsed calculators as part of its
reform of consumer financial regulations,' and the CFPB has begun
offering online calculators to help citizens shop for and understand
consumer loans.5"
150. Eg., Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 3 (2006).
151. For a thumbnail sketch of how the GUI and drop-down menus made computer
operating systems more user-friendly, see LINDA NULL & JULIA LOBUR, THE ESSENTIALS OF
COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND ARCHITECTURE 414 (2003).
152. 17 C.ER. § 229.305.
153. See Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 65
(June 17, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport web.pdf. These
current calculators are designed to help consumers and investors calculate financial needs,
not to show financial disclosure under different scenarios and assumptions.
154. See, e.g., Owning a Home: Explore Interest Rates, CFPB, http://www.consumer




More radical technological changes to disclosure might help
investors navigate systemic complexity.
1. Investment Portfolio Information
Data tags used for tracking mortgages, asset-backed securities,
and derivatives also could enable investors to see with more
granularity the assets and liabilities in a firm's balance sheet. This
kind of granular disclosure would allow investors to spot accounting
gamesmanship or risks in a firm's financial statements that are masked
by more aggregated information. It would also allow investors to
comb through balance sheets of individual firms and then make
comparisons among firms. These comparisons might uncover
potentially dangerous areas of homogeneity lurking in the balance
sheets and risk profiles of multiple firms. The ability to drill down
into balance sheets might prove particularly helpful for investors
seeking to analyze the portfolios of investment funds.
2. Open-Source Risk Models?
Regulators might consider requiring that issuers, particularly
financial institutions, disclose much greater detail on the
methodologies and assumptions behind the models used to price asset-
backed securities and derivatives and to measure and manage an
issuer's overall risk. A more radical approach would force disclosure
of the algorithms in these models, in essence making this software
open-source. This would allow investors to analyze the models in
greater detail and spot limitations, bugs, and the potential for
dangerous homogeneity among the models of different firms.'55
An open-source approach would come with several costs. First,
being forced to disclose proprietary information might discourage
firms from investing in innovative risk models. Second, disclosure of
risk models might open issuers to exploitation from other market
participants. For example, there is some evidence that when rating
agencies disclosed their models for rating asset-backed-securities
issuances, savvy investment bankers devised new ways to game the
models and gain higher ratings for riskier mortgages.56 Third,
155. GERDtNG, supra note 72, at 189-91.
156. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Rating Agency Data Aided Wall Street in
Deals; N.Y TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/business/24rating.
html.
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enhanced disclosure of risk models might encourage more copycatting
and thus dangerously increase the homogeneity of investment
behavior.157
D Technological Enhancements: AnAppraisal
The smorgasbord of technological enhancements outlined in this
Part face several common and deep challenges. First, these
enhancements do not directly answer the questions raised by the
overload critique. More particularly, it is not clear that technological
enhancements will be used by investors or would be effective in
helping them sift through data on issuers and securities. Whether
investors would demand, use, and use effectively many of these
enhancements requires evidentiary support, which might be obtained
through surveys or empirical and experimental testing, a subject that I
return to in Part IVA. Furthermore, many of these enhancements do
not directly address some of the information failures at the heart of the
financial crisis. The unraveling of structured finance and derivative
markets had much to do with the poor incentives of issuers and market
intermediaries to create, verify, and pass along quality information
about securities and underlying assets. In some cases, market
participants had incentives to obscure, misrepresent, or destroy that
information. I return to these problems and look at how disclosure
might address them in Part IVC.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the critiques of-whether of the overload or complexity
variety-and the technological enhancements to mandatory disclosure
suffer from similar flaws: a lack of sufficient evidentiary foundation
and an oblique connection to the information-incentive problems at the
heart of the recent financial crisis. I turn in this Conclusion to ways
that disclosure reforms might begin to develop evidence and address
incentives. But first, I note that there are regulatory alternatives to
disclosure.
Much of the scholarship on information overload and complexity
and the rhetoric surrounding the SEC's Disclosure Effectiveness
initiative has a strong deregulatory valence. However, there is another
potential implication: if the risks of an issuer indeed cause
information overload and are "too complex to depict," then perhaps
157. GERDING, supranote 72, at 512.
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that issuer's securities are too complex to sell. One alternative to
mandatory disclosure as a regulatory tool is substantive merit-based
regulation of issuers and the securities that they can sell. In the last
decade, a range of legal scholars across the political spectrum have
proposed licensing regimes that would govern the sale of complex
financial products.158 Although, policy makers often look to disclosure
regimes to stave off less politically palatable substantive regulation,'
59
disclosure and licensing regimes need not be either-or options.
Furthermore, substantive regulation might also address the incentives
of issuers and intermediaries to create, verify, and pass along
information. For example, Dodd-Frank's "skin in the game" regula-
tions require originators of mortgages to retain part of the risk of the
assets being fed into a securitization in order to align originator
incentives with those of investors in asset-backed securities.'"
A. Beta Testing Disclosure
Given the lack of empirical data surrounding the overload
critique and much of the complexity critique as well, the SEC should
conduct rigorous empirical testing before pruning long-standing
disclosure requirements. At the same time, policy makers should
conduct empirical testing of technologically enhanced disclosure. As a
first step, the SEC should survey investors, particularly institutional
investors, to see what pieces of existing disclosure are used and what
new information they believe would improve their decision making.
Economists are often skeptical of survey data and instead look for
revealed preferences. The SEC could conduct event studies to see
whether the revelation of certain pieces of information by issuers had
an impact on an issuer's stock price. However, event studies work best
when discrete pieces of information are disclosed. It thus may be hard
158. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal: MandatoryApproval of Complex
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 63 (2012); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA
for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twen(y-First-Century
Financial Markets, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1307 (2013); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008) (suggesting that financial products
should be regulated like other consumer products).
159. This can be seen in the history and politics of the Roosevelt Administration's
choice to make disclosure, rather than merit-based regulation, the cornerstone of the
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,
48 Stat. 881. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities
Regulation and the Case for Fedeml]Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 647, 678-80 (2010).
160. Gerding, supra note 97, at 126-27 (discussing this rule and scholarship on it).
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to test the materiality of bundles of disclosure items."' Web-based
disclosure may offer the SEC new and rich data sets on the usefulness
of various disclosure items because click-through data can reveal
which pieces of information investors are using.
Experimental data might offer other insights into how investors
use various pieces of disclosure and how well they understand that
data. Legal scholars have increasingly advocated using methodologies
from experimental economics to test the effectiveness of various legal
rules. '62 Of course, experiments must be carefully designed to achieve
sufficient reliability and validity.
B. Code Is Law; Disclosure Is Law
Both the recent calls to simplify disclosure and the initiatives to
technologically enhance disclosure raise a profound question: Who
decides what is disclosed to investors and how it is disclosed? Several
decades of research in psychology and behavioral economics
underscores the fundamental importance of how information is framed
as to how decisions are made. The stakes of decisions for mandatory
issuer disclosure are high, affecting how capital is allocated in the
economy and the extent to which investors are protected from bad
decisions and deceptions large and small. The chance to redesign
disclosure via technology is more than just technocratic whimsy. As
cyberlaw scholars are fond of saying, "code is law."'63  Seemingly
technical decisions about how financial data or loans are tagged and
how disclosure is presented can have enormous impacts not only on
the compliance costs to issuers, but also on the decisions of investors.
Who controls the format of disclosure can shape investor choices.
There is a danger that technology and any disclosure reforms,
deregulatory or otherwise, might give investors the illusion that they
are making independent decisions based on neutral information and
that they have more capacity to understand risk than they do.
161. James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs To Lie More After Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653, 674, 684-85 (2007).
162. See, eg, Erik F Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-
MarketApproach to Analyzing FinancialRegulaton, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 977 (arguing for the
use of experimental asset market research to test securities regulations); EXPERiMENTAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Jennifer H. Arlen & Eric L. Talley eds., 2008) (surveying the emergent
field).
163. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3-6 (1999).
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C In Praise of Old-Time Disclosure. On the Incentives oflssuers
and Intermediai'es
One of the central limitations of the overload and complexity
critiques is that both discount the potential for issuers and
intermediaries to game disclosure rules and manipulate disclosure.
Issuers might intentionally overload investors or make financial
transactions and disclosure more complex than they need to be in order
to obscure risks from investors or regulators. Some of the biggest
information failures in the recent subprime crisis came not because
information was destroyed, but because someone destroyed the
information. In securitization, originators, investment banks, and
credit rating agencies had perverse incentives not to perform due
diligence on the riskiness of underlying assets and not to pass on
sufficient information on that risk to investors. In some cases,
intermediaries deceived investors about the riskiness of assets or
confficts of interest at the heart of transactions. This all argues in favor
of reinvigorating the following three old-fashioned staples of
mandatory disclosure:
Use of proceeds or the purposes for which a securities
issuance is being made. For example, investors should know if
an issuer is using an issuance to game regulations (e.g., tax or
banking laws). This would inform the market about the
incentives of issuers and intermediaries to structure issuances in
ways that might diverge from the interests of some or all
investors. As noted above, issuers, intermediaries, and even
subsets of investors structured securitization tranches to game
banking regulations in ways that masked risk from regulators and
other investors."
The level of diligence undertaken by underwriters and other
interrediares. As noted above, investment banks paid billions to
settle lawsuits alleging that they failed to disclose the level of
screening they performed with respect to the mortgages and other
assets that went into securitizations.65 More disclosure about the
level of diligence performed by intermediaries would give
investors in both securitizations and even plain-vanilla stocks and
bonds better information about the efficacy of intermediaries and
164. See supm note 72 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part ll.C.2.
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the gatekeeping function they perform. Gatekeeping is essential
to capital markets.
166
Conficts of interest of intermedian'es. The financial crisis
also underscored how conflicts of interest could undermine the
incentives of underwriters and other gatekeepers to help investors
separate wheat from chaff.'67  Policy makers should beef up
mandatory disclosure about compensation and business or
investment arrangements that might put the interest of an
intermediary in conflict with the interests of those investors
relying on that intermediary.
These three broad areas for disclosure reform share several
characteristics. First, they would be backstopped by the extensive
antifraud liability regimes in federal securities laws, which might not
be the case for many of the technological fixes outlined in Part III.
Second, they reflect the fact that complexity in issuers, financial
instruments, and markets is not a natural phenomenon, but rather is
created by issuers and their representatives for purposes that, at times,
have little benefit for investors (e.g., creating opaque issuers or
markets in order to charge higher prices, game regulations, or even
deceive investors). Third, understanding the incentives of issuers and
intermediaries in creating securities and securities markets remains
one of the foundational concerns of securities disclosure and securities
regulation. Casting sunlight on those incentives improves them-even
if the improvement is imperfect-and helps issuers, intermediaries,
and markets perform their proper functions. Rethinking the details of
mandatory disclosure in these fundamental areas might do far more to
enhance investor information than either taking a chainsaw to
disclosure rules or fashioning hi-tech solutions to disclosure problems.
Sometimes the best solution to complexity is simplicity.
166. For a small sample of the germinal literature on gatekeepers, see, for example,
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Stategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986), and John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandngEnron: "'ItlAbout he
Gatekeepers, Stupid "57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002).
167. See supm Part II.C.2.
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